Rankings and Social Tournaments: Evidence From a Crowd-Sourcing Experiment

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Related Collections

Degree type

Discipline

Subject

Rank Incentives
Social Tournaments
Feedback
Field Experiment
Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods

Funder

Grant number

License

Copyright date

Distributor

Related resources

Contributor

Abstract

There is a growing interest in behavioral incentive schemes exploiting people preference about how they rank compared to others as a non-monetary mechanism to shape effort. In this paper we present evidence from a crowd-sourcing experiment where employees were given feedback about how they rank in terms of performance compared to others doing the same task. The context is such that rank had no implication for current or future compensation. Compared to a control group with no rank feedback, employees who received feedback about their rank were less likely to return to work and also less productive on the job.

Advisor

Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)

Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)

Digital Object Identifier

Series name and number

Publication date

2011-01-01

Volume number

Issue number

Publisher

Publisher DOI

Journal Issues

Comments

Recommended citation

Collection