Christoffersen, Susan Elizabeth KerrGeczy, Christopher CMusto, David KReed, Adam V2023-05-222023-05-222007-01-012016-06-15https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/34385The standard analysis of corporate governance assumes that shareholders vote in ratios that firms choose, such as one share-one vote. However, if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the U.S. equity loan market, where the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates the vote trade and find support in the cross section. More trading occurs for higher-spread and worse-performing firms, especially when voting is close. Vote trading corresponds to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals.This is the peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01296.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.FinanceFinance and Financial ManagementArticle