Chen, JoeHarrington, Joseph E2023-05-222023-05-222007-01-012017-10-11https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/5200Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modeled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners' Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms' prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs—such as in the U.S.—can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.© 2007. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/BusinessEconomicsPublic Affairs, Public Policy and Public AdministrationArticle