Araujo, AloisioGottlieb, Daniel AMoreira, Humberto2023-05-222023-05-222007-01-012016-06-25https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/5273We develop a job-market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Araujo, Aloisio, Daniel Gottlieb, and Humberto Moreira. “A Model of Mixed Signals with Applications to Countersignaling,” RAND Journal of Economics, winter 2007, pp. 1020-1043 , which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving (http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms).EconomicsArticle