Core, John E2023-05-222023-05-222001-09-012016-06-01https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/1088Healy and Palepu, J. Account. Econ. (2001), this issue, provide a broad review of the empirical disclosure literature. This discussion focuses on the empirical voluntary disclosure literature, and assumes firms’ disclosure policies are endogenously determined by the same forces that shape firms’ governance structures and management incentives. This provides not only a more focused view of the literature, but also alternative explanations for some of the results discussed in Review and specific suggestions for future research.© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/disclosureinformation asymmetrycost of capitalmanagerial incentivescorporate governanceAccountingBusiness Administration, Management, and OperationsArticle