Capron, LaurenceGuillén, Mauro F2023-05-222023-05-222009-08-012018-07-09https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/40465We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders' and employees' interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate governance institutions prevalent in both the host and the target country of the merging firms enable or constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a cross‐national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post‐acquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and leverage the target's resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and redeploy resources to and from the target.This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [Capron, L. & Guillén, M.F. (2009). National Corporate Governance Institutions and Post-Acquisition Target Reorganization. Strategic Management Journal 30, no. 8: pp. 803-833], which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.768. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.mergers and acquisitionspost-merger restructuringnational governance systemsgovernance institutionsinstitutional environmentstakeholder theoryBusiness Administration, Management, and OperationsBusiness and Corporate CommunicationsBusiness IntelligenceBusiness Law, Public Responsibility, and EthicsManagement Information SystemsManagement Sciences and Quantitative MethodsOrganizational Behavior and TheoryStrategic Management PolicyReport