Clemons, Eric KMadhani, Nehal2023-05-222016-06-082010-01-012017-08-22https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/34577Some digital business models may be so innovative that they overwhelm existing regulatory mechanisms, both legislation and historical jurisprudence, and require extension to or modification of antitrust law. Regulatory policies that were developed in response to nineteenth- or twentieth-century antitrust concerns dealt principally with economies of scale leading to monopoly power and may not be well suited to the issues of network effects or third-party payer online business models such as sponsored search. From the perspective of information systems economics, we investigate if such third-party payer digital systems require intervention as profound as the government's innovative approach to the problems posed by AT&T in the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, establishing the first private regulated monopoly. Google provides an example of a company whose innovative digital business model is difficult to fit into current regulatory frameworks, and may provide examples of the issues that might require an extension to regulatory policy.This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Management Information Systems on 2010, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.2753/MIS0742-1222270303antitrustbundling and tyingcontestabilitydeterred market entrydigital business strategiesessential facilities doctrineGooglekey word auctionsonline searchrelevant market sharesponsored searchBusinessFinance and Financial ManagementRegulation of Digital Businesses with Natural Monopolies or Third-Party Payment Business Models: Antitrust Lessons from the Analysis of GoogleArticle