Shing-Yi WangTabaza, Joud K2023-05-222023-05-222022-01-012022-06-09https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/37815Borrower debt relief stands as a widely utilized, yet deeply contentious economic policy enacted by governments universally. This paper adopts a difference-in-differences design to study the impact of a women-targeted mass borrower relief program enacted by the government of Jordan in 2019 on credit market outcomes of formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). I find that the program led to significant credit rationing and reallocation from women and areas of higher risk to men and areas of lower risk. Post-program levels of MFI portfolio risk remain stable with no evidence supporting the existence of moral hazard among MFIs, suggesting stricter lending practices in response to the relief.Microfinancemicrocreditborrower reliefdebt forgivenesscredit market interventioncredit rationingmoral hazardadverse selectionJordanemerging marketsBusinessEconomic PolicyEconomicsFinanceGrowth and DevelopmentOther EconomicsPolicy Design, Analysis, and EvaluationPolitical EconomyPublic PolicyDissertation/Thesis