Chakraborty, ArchishmanYilmaz, Bilge2023-05-222023-05-222004-01-012016-05-26https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/34501In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.© 2004. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Economic TheoryFinance and Financial ManagementArticle